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Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public
Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative
behavior in model societies. In such games, contributions to the public good are made only by cooperators,
while all players, including defectors, can reap public goods benefits. Classic results of game theory show that
mutual defection, as opposed to cooperation, is the Nash Equilibrium of PGGs in well-mixed populations,
where each player interacts with all others. In this paper, we explore the coevolutionary dynamics of a low
information public goods game on a network without spatial constraints in which players adapt to their
environment in order to increase individual payoffs. Players adapt by changing their strategies, either to
cooperate or to defect, and by altering their social connections. We find that even if players do not know other
players’ strategies and connectivity, cooperation can arise and persist despite large short-term fluctuations.
Keywords: cooperation, complex networks, evolutionary game theory, public goods game
Evolutionary models of cooperation have been ac-
tively studied by biologists, physicists, economists
and mathematicians. Early game theoretic mod-
els involving two players, such as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, have been generalized to multi-
player games where players, or agents, interact
with all others as cooperators or defectors. It-
erative games allow players to change strategies,
often with knowledge of neighbor strategies and
payoffs. Subsequently, spatial structure has been
incorporated into multiplayer games by arranging
players on simple lattices defining local interac-
tion partners. Since social connections in applica-
tions are often not limited by space, complex net-
works have become the arena for numerous games
investigating the emergence and stability of coop-
eration. Games on networks with diverse topolo-
gies have illuminated the importance of network
structure on dynamics, yet most models assume a
static network topology. We study Public Goods
Games on evolving complex networks to model
the realistic setting where social structure varies
along with individual strategy changes. We find
parameter regimes where cooperation is favored
and players become highly connected, all without
knowing the strategies of neighboring players.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of social cohesion, cooperation and con-
nectivity between individuals, are general features essen-
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b)Author to whom correspondence should be addressed. Electronic
mail: avi.m.shapiro@gmail.com
tial for the overall functioning of a society. Successful so-
cieties tend to have high levels of cooperation and social
cohesion16,29 while the opposite is true of less functional
societies.16 It has been shown that the interaction pattern
between individuals or the topological structure of social
groups plays a significant role in the evolution of cooper-
ative behavior, although conclusions vary. Whether net-
work heterogeneity favors cooperation is unclear. For
prisoner dilemma games, regular graphs support coop-
eration the most while scale-free graphs do not support
cooperation at all,13 however it is hypothesized that this
may depend on the specific rules of games. Indeed, scale-
free graphs are shown to support cooperation in similar
games.23–25 In most studies, including these, the network
structure is static throughout the evolutionary game, un-
like in real societies.
To study the emergence of cooperation in a more gen-
eral and realistic setting, we consider a game theoretic
model of a group of interacting individuals, a repeated
public goods game (PGG) involving mobile players with
two different behavioral strategies: cooperation and de-
fection. A PGG generalizes the Prisoner’s Dilemma to
more than two players and allows for greater diversity in
system evolution.2,3,9,25,27
In a PGG, cooperators contribute a certain amount
to the public good and defectors do not, yet all players
receive an equal share of the sum of contributions, mul-
tiplied by a synergy factor. If every player cooperates,
then everyone benefits, and if every player defects, then
no one benefits. Clearly, a single player is better off when
many or all other game participants cooperate. However,
an individual who defects still receives the group bene-
fits without any cost. This so-called free-rider problem,10
leads to a situation in which no one cooperates. Still, co-
operation persists in real societies.
In a well-mixed population, where every player in-
teracts with every other player, the Nash equilibrium
of PGGs is total defection, leading to the tragedy of
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2the commons,10 in which public resources are exhausted.
Spatially restricted versions of PGGs have been stud-
ied, typically on simple lattices with nearest neighbor
interactions,22 in order to demonstrate how cooperation
can flourish in more complicated yet realistic systems.
Motivated by applications to peer-to-peer, mobile, and
vehicular networks, we generalize such studies by allow-
ing varying connections between arbitrary players on ar-
bitrary nodes in a non-planar network topology. Allowing
for the network topology to coevolve with player strategy
has been studied using the Prisoner’s Dilemma game5,7,30
and various other symmetric two-player games.20,21
Models of strategy and network evolution often follow a
random satisfying dynamic7,26 reminiscent of biological
(genetic) evolution, or an imitation dynamic14,30 remi-
niscent of social evolution. In both cases, a player’s de-
cisions to change strategies or connections is dependent
on knowledge of neighbors’ strategies and payoffs, a high
information requirement which often does lead to high
levels of cooperation. However, even among knowledge-
able humans, experiments have shown individuals often
do not always imitate the best neighbor strategy.28 In
order to create a minimal model, we consider a low infor-
mation setting in which player decisions depend only on
individual payoffs. Despite lacking mechanisms such as
punishment6,11 or reputation effects,6 which are known
to promote cooperation, we observe both high levels of
cooperation and connectivity for a range of model pa-
rameters while the adaptive network develops a highly
peaked degree distribution.
II. PUBLIC GOODS GAME
A. PGG in well-mixed populations
In a PGG, cooperators contribute a certain amount
to the public good and defectors do not. All players
then receive an equal share of the sum of all contribu-
tions multiplied by a synergy factor, r ≥ 1, accounting
for non-zero-sum benefits of cooperation. Given n mutu-
ally interacting players including nC cooperators, we can
write the payoffs for cooperators and defectors,
piC = rc
nC
n
− c, piD = rcnC
n
, (1)
where c is the fixed cost of cooperation per game. In com-
mon formulations, b = rc is the benefit of cooperation so
that synergy, r = b/c, is the benefit-cost ratio.13,16,18,19
Without loss of generality, we take c = 1. Other vari-
ations of PGGs have a fixed cost per individual, with
an equal fraction contributed to each game the individ-
ual plays. This variation is only quantitatively distinct
in the heterogeneous populations discussed below in Sec-
tion II B, yet is often more supportive of cooperation than
the one considered here.25,27 Our modeling decisions have
been guided by the avoidance of common mechanisms to
induce widespread cooperation such as those mentioned
in Section I.
Cooperators earn a lower payoff than defectors since
Equations (1) clearly imply piC < piD. If all n players are
defectors, their payoffs are zero. If one player is instead
a cooperator, its payoff decreases and becomes negative
if r < n. Hence, an individual defector has no incen-
tive to unilaterally switch to become a cooperator. The
Nash Equilibrium in a PGG is thus total defection. In
repeated games, as we consider here, players may change
strategies after each round based on their payoffs. In
a well-mixed population with homogeneous social struc-
ture, when players seek to maximize their payoffs, the
dynamics lead to total defection, as in the single round
game.
To investigate a mechanism which promotes coopera-
tion, one may relax the well-mixed assumption and in-
clude a spatial interaction structure so that individuals
only play with a subset of the population. Spatial games
often take place on simple lattices.17 To generalize such
local interactions, this paper focuses on a PGG on a dy-
namic, complex network described in Section II B.
B. PGG on a complex network
On a network or graph consisting of nodes and edges,
a separate game is played in a neighborhood centered on
each player. A neighborhood is composed of a central
player and all neighbors, the players connected to the
central player by a single edge. A player’s total payoff
is accumulated from each game played. So a highly con-
nected player can earn payoffs from many games. For
example, in Figure 1, a player at node 1 has three neigh-
bors and thus collects a total payoff from four separate
games (only two are shown). A player without any con-
nected neighbors does not play any games.
1
2
PGG
1
PGG
2
FIG. 1. Example network of public goods games
In this network setting, each player can be connected
to any other, so the number of players in a single game is
only bounded by the total network size. In contrast, on
a 2D regular square lattice, players are only connected to
nearest neighbors (either at most 4 for a von Neumann
3or 8 for a Moore neighborhood22). Similarly, location
(and thus, neighbor) changes for a player are usually lim-
ited to spaces within a certain distance in such cellular
automata. With such restrictions, an unsatisfied player
may not be able to change its location or connections to
other players sufficiently to reflect its level of dissatisfac-
tion.
Players make separate decisions about strategy and
connectivity and each decision creates its own dilemma.
Profit-maximizing players should all choose the Nash
equilibrium strategy of defection (if r < n), which leads
to zero payoff for all players, clearly the worst possible
state in terms of total wealth. This is the classic social
dilemma which also exists in the well-mixed case. On a
network, it is also advantageous to participate in a large
number of games with many cooperators. However, this
runs the risk of being exploited by many defectors. This
is the secondary dilemma due to the irregular distribu-
tion of edges and node strategies throughout the dynamic
network. In Section III, we introduce repeated PGG up-
date and decision rules which overcome these dilemmas.
III. COEVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS
The following dynamical rules closely follow Roca et
al.22 The behavior of the players is driven by the individ-
ual player’s satisfaction. Based on the level of satisfac-
tion, a player may change strategy and/or connectivity
to other players as detailed in the following sections.
A. State variables
At time step t, player i may change strategy and/or
neighbors (network plasticity) with independent proba-
bilities based on its satisfaction,
si(t) = pii(t)− ai(t) + ηi(t), (2)
where pii is the net payoff from all games played by player
i, ηi is a Gaussian noise, and ai is aspiration, defined
ai(t) = αpii,max(t) + (1− α)pii,min(t)
= pii,min(t) + α
(
pii,max(t)− pii,min(t)
)
, (3)
which depends on greediness 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, another impor-
tant control parameter. Aspiration is a convex combina-
tion of functions pii,max/min which reflect (finite) memory
of past max/min payoffs. A habituation effect is modeled
by defining the update equations
pii,max(t+ 1) = pii(t) + (1− µ) (pii,max(t)− pii(t))
H
(
pii,max(t)− pii(t)
)
,
(4)
pii,min(t+ 1) = pii(t)− (1− µ) (pii(t)− pii,min(t))
H
(
pii(t)− pii,min(t)
)
,
(5)
where H is the Heaviside step function. The quantity
1− µ describes a fractional memory length. Our choice,
µ = 0.01, implies a long but finite memory. The noise
term ηi(t) is drawn from a Gaussian distribution with
mean zero and standard deviation 0.1.
B. System Evolution
At each time step, an unsatisfied player (si < 0) is
allowed to make any or all of three updates: change
strategy, add an edge to a random player (excluding self-
edges and multiple edges), or remove an edge to a ran-
dom neighbor. The outcomes of each possible update are
based on three independent trials with probability
pi(t) = tanh(|si|/k)H(−si). (6)
The scaling factor, k = 8, as in Ref. 22, and ensures a
range of probabilities so that very unsatisfied players are
more likely to change their state than slightly unsatisfied
players. The Heaviside function ensures that players with
non-negative satisfaction do not change their strategies or
neighbors. While this probability function is continuous
in satisfaction, it changes quickly as satisfaction crosses
zero and is thus very sensitive. A player’s satisfaction
and change probability depend strongly on the current
network topology. To allow each player to change neigh-
bors and/or strategy based on the same network state,
updating is performed synchronously.
IV. RESULTS
A. Initial Conditions
To test whether cooperation can develop in a non-
cooperative environment, we assume all players are ini-
tially defectors and allow cooperation to emerge stochas-
tically due to the noise in Equation (2). Our main results
are simulated using an initial network with no edges. Re-
markably, a variety of other initial networks, including
small world and scale-free networks, result in very simi-
lar long time behavior.
While we have conducted simulations using various
network sizes and parameters, we present results on
PGGs consisting of 1000 players and focus on the effects
of the two parameters synergy, r, and greediness, α on
cooperation and network structure.
B. PGG Dynamics/Evolution
1. Single simulation
The model evolution is captured by the variables co-
operation, the cooperator fraction, instability, the frac-
tion of players changing strategies or neighbors, and ag-
4glomeration, the average node degree.1 Time series for
these variables are shown in Figure 2, where r = 4 and
α = 0.65. To observe overall trends through the stochas-
ticity, time series show data averaged over a moving win-
dow of 100 time steps.
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FIG. 2. Typical simulation run that favors cooperation. The
network has 1000 players, initially all defectors with zero
edges. Game parameters are synergy, r = 4, and greediness,
α = 0.65. Time series are averaged over a moving window of
100 time steps.
We observe several characteristic periods of behavior.
Initially, many edges are added and sustained, increasing
average node degree rapidly from zero while there is a
short lived spike in cooperation. Second, agglomeration
increases slowly while cooperation remains low but with
growing fluctuation. Third, cooperation jumps up and
agglomeration follows. Lastly, cooperation remains high
while agglomeration grows slowly.
Stochasticity in the system arises from the aspiration
noise in Equation (2) and causes large amplitude cooper-
ation fluctuations shown in Figure 3 and Appendix A.
The upper plot in Figure 3 shows the original highly
1 While the clustering coefficient might be a more appropriate mea-
sure on a network, results are qualitatively similar to those of the
simpler measure average degree.
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FIG. 3. Large amplitude fluctations in cooperation time se-
ries from simulation shown in Figure 2. (upper) Short but
large variations in cooperator fraction are present in the raw
data. (lower) Averaging over a moving window of 100 time
steps reveals overall trend while smoothing high frequency
oscillations.
oscillatory cooperator time series while the lower is av-
eraged over a sliding window of 100 time steps, as in
Figure 2. The amplitude of oscillations in the raw data
reveal a high level of strategy synchronization between
players even though players make independent decisions.
These fluctuations and resulting synchronization are due
to the habituation effect in satisfaction modeled in equa-
tions (2), (3), (4), and (5). The evolution of satisfaction
is shown in Figure 4 without window averaging. Due
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FIG. 4. Network averaged satisfaction time series. The pos-
itive spikes and subsequent exponential decay cause the os-
cillations in cooperation in Figure 3. Time series is from the
same simulation as used in Figures 2 and 3 and is shown
without moving window averaging.
to Equations (3), (4), and (5), unless recent payoffs are
higher than pii,max, satisfaction will decrease toward zero.
At late times, after the onset of high cooperation, we
do observe positive average satisfaction decaying to zero,
then a large number of strategy changes toward defection
dropping satisfaction far below zero. This induces strate-
gies to revert back toward cooperation and satisfaction
resets at a positive value.
PGG evolution only occurs when satisfaction decreases
5below zero, i.e. when aspiration nears payoff. This is an
imposed feature of the model, described by the equations
in Section III, yet, as we have seen, has interesting con-
sequences. For long times, when high cooperation and
agglomeration have been reached, the network is still sub-
ject to intermittent cooperation crashes which occur with
some regularity. The time scale of such crashes should
depend on µ and α. Here we make that dependency ex-
plicit under some mild assumptions and show that higher
µ and α increase the frequency of cooperation collapses.
Consider a satisfied player i whose neighbors and their
strategies are not changing at a given time step t0.
Then, for some time later, the player’s payoff is constant,
pii(t) ≈ pii(t0) for t0 ≤ t ≤ t1. Assume also the strict
bounds pii,min(t) < pii(t) < pii,max(t). The relaxation of
the maximum and minimum payoffs toward the current
(constant) payoff occurs at the same rate as the relax-
ation of satisfaction to the size of the noise. Given the
stated assumptions on payoff, it is shown in Appendix B
that
si(t) ≈ Ki(α)e−µ(t−t0) + ηi(t), t0 ≤ t ≤ t1, (7)
where
Ki(α) = [pii(t0)− pii,min(t0)]
− α [pii,max(t0)− pii,min(t0)] (8)
is a linearly decreasing function of α.
The behavior of satisfaction shown in Equation 7 leads
to several important conclusions regarding the effects of
the memory and greediness parameters. Recall, the faster
satisfaction decays to zero, the sooner a collapse in coop-
eration occurs. For short memory (high µ), satisfaction
decreases toward zero faster, increasing the frequency of
cooperation collapse.
If µ is fixed, then what controls the duration of a period
of quasi-stability in cooperation, as seen in the upper plot
in Figure 3, is the initial amplitude of the satisfaction de-
cay, Ki(α). A lower amplitude reduces the time required
for a player to become dissatisfied and shortens the inter-
val between huge collapses in cooperation, making such
collapses more frequent. Three factors contribute to a
lower amplitude. Clearly, and most importantly, the ex-
pression for Ki(α) shows the amplitude decreases linearly
with greediness. Additionally, if the payoff is close to
its minimum or if the difference between the maximum
and minimum payoffs is large, the amplitude is also di-
minished. These variations and the random noise are re-
sponsible for the irregular timing of cooperation collapses
even for a fixed α and µ.
Notice that synergy, r, does not appear explicitly in
Equation (7), but actually scales all of the payoffs in
Ki(α) due to Equation (1). In other words, higher syn-
ergy should increase satisfaction, as expected.
2. Multiple simulations
Several simulations for each parameter pair reveal con-
sistently similar behavior, although shifted in time; see
Figure 5. This is one example of the system’s strong
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FIG. 5. Stochasticity in onset of cooperation. Multiple simu-
lations for the parameters in Figure 2 show similar behavior
but shifted in time due to the stochasticity of the system.
sensitivity to small perturbations due to random edge
attachment and the sharp difference in the probability of
state changes for satisfactions near zero.
Despite strong time dependence of cooperation, long
time averages show, similarly to the 2D lattice setting in
Ref. 22, the existence of parameter regions which result
in both high and low cooperativity after sufficient rounds
of PGGs. However, Figure 6 shows that the transition
between these regions is sharper in the network setting.
This phase diagram shows greediness encourages co-
operation, especially for low synergy where the cost to
cooperate is highest. When synergy is at least 10, high
cooperation results for all levels of greediness. Remark-
ably, given Equations (1), the highest cooperation levels
do not occur at highest synergy. Low instability through-
out most of phase space shows the cooperation levels are
nearly stationary at the end of simulations.
C. Network Topology
In order to study the sharp divide between cooperator
and defector dominated regions in phase space seen in
Figure 6, we investigate the long time network degree
distribution and time dependent edge placement.
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FIG. 6. Phase diagrams depicting the fraction of cooperators, fraction of strategy and/or edge changers, and scaled average
node degree (agglomeration) of PGGs as functions of synergy, r, and greediness, α. Values are computed for PGGs with 1000
players averaged over the last 100 of 20,000 time steps.
1. Degree distribution
The network topology evolves during the simulation
and a player can have between 0 and n − 1 edges. As
players add connections to others, their node degree in-
creases. The long term degree distribution is surprisingly
narrow and peaked for parameters which exhibit high co-
operation, such as for r = 4, α = 0.65 shown in Figure 7.
Note the absence of high degree nodes or hubs. This dis-
tribution is suggestive of an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph.8
In fact, this PGG could be used as a network growth
mechanism.
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r = 3, α = 0.65 r = 4, α = 0.65
FIG. 7. Degree distribution for a 1000 node network at t =
20000. The r = 3 (r = 4) distribution corresponds to a low
(high) cooperation long term state.
2. Edge dynamics
While full network topology as shown by degree distri-
bution is clearly quite different for parameters exhibiting
high and low cooperation, it is valuable to look closer at
the connections of cooperators and defectors separately
over time. In particular, we would like to determine
whether cooperators are located at nonrandom nodes in
the graph and how their statistics differ from defectors.
We begin by considering the dynamics of edges be-
ing added to each type of player for the case r = 4 and
α = 0.65, parameters near the sharp transition in Fig-
ure 6. The edge dynamics in Figure 8 show growth in
edges involving cooperators but not to the extent that
cooperators are accumulating edges preferentially. While
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D-D edges
FIG. 8. Stacked bar plot for edges between two cooperators
(C-C), a cooperator and a defector (C-D), and two defectors
(D-D). Note the resemblance of the total edges curve to the
agglomeration plot from the same simulation in Figure 2. r =
4 and α = 0.65.
the total number of edges increases, the distribution of
edge types shows a strong and meaningful relationship
to the number of cooperators, which is also changing. In
fact, the number of C-C, C-D, and D-D edges varies with
cooperation as would be expected if edges were placed
randomly.
First, consider a complete graph KN with N = NC +
ND nodes of cooperators and defectors. Then we can
7count the number of edges connecting any two nodes,
M , two cooperators, MCC, a cooperator and a defector,
MCD, and two defectors, MDD, as follows
M =
(
N
2
)
=
1
2
N(N − 1),
MCC =
(
NC
2
)
=
1
2
NC(NC − 1),
MCD = NCND = NC(N −NC),
MDD =
(
ND
2
)
=
1
2
ND(ND − 1).
(9)
In an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with N nodes and edge
probability p ∈ (0, 1), the edge counts would all be mul-
tiplied by p on average. In other words, the scaling of
edges versus nodes would be the same as in Equations (9).
The log-log plots of PGG graph data in Figure 9a show
MCC and MDD are quadratic in NC and ND, respectively.
Likewise, Figure 10 shows MCD is linear in the product
NCND. In the plots, points darken as time advances and
a restricted data range is chosen centered at the onset
of high cooperation, near t = 15000. Indeed, we observe
in the PGG, long time edge scaling consistent with an
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph.
3. Cooperator clustering
With edges suggesting the network is evolving into a
random graph, it is not clear whether cooperators and
defectors occupy completely random positions within the
network. We would like to determine whether strategy
statistics for a player’s immediate neighbors differ sig-
nificantly from statistics of the whole network. Given
a network, we can simply calculate if cooperators have
a higher fraction of cooperating neighbors, on average,
〈(nC−1)/(nC−1+nD)〉, than the fraction of cooperators
in the whole network, (NC − 1)/(NC − 1 +ND). If this is
the case, then cooperators are showing evidence of clus-
tering. (Note that we subtract one in the above ratios to
omit a central cooperator from the counts.) The differ-
ence between these two ratios is shown for various greed-
iness and synergy values in the heatmap in Figure 11.
One simulation for each parameter pair has been used
rather than an ensemble average. Positive values indi-
cate neighborhoods having more cooperators than would
be expected if they were uniformly distributed over the
network.
Figure 11 shows that there are parameter regions in
which some local cooperator clustering is present. These
regions resemble the regions of high cooperation in the
leftmost plot in Figure 6. In other words, when coopera-
tion flourishes, cooperators are taking advantage of net-
work reciprocity.13,16,18 However, the magnitude of this
effect is very small, since the values in Figure 11 are gen-
erally very close to zero. To get a sense of scale, imagine
that 1% of the players were to become cooperators; then
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FIG. 9. Edge counts between players of like strategy. The
passage of time is indicated by the darkening of points with
data taken from the simulation used in Figure 2. The data
range plotted is centered at the onset of high cooperation,
near t = 15000. r = 4 and α = 0.65.
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FIG. 10. Edge counts between cooperators and defectors.
Parameters are as in Figure 9.
the values in the heatmap would decrease by approxi-
mately 0.010, an amount greater than the magnitude of
most of the current values.
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FIG. 11. Deviation of neighborhood cooperator fraction from
full network cooperator fraction, 〈(nC − 1)/(nC − 1 + nD)〉 −
(NC − 1)/(NC − 1 +ND). Parameters are as in Figure 9.
V. SUMMARY
The behavior of a spatially constrained, low informa-
tion (no exchange of strategy, position, or connectivity)
repeated PGG was previously analyzed by Roca et al.22
with a cellular automaton model on a 2D square lattice.
In such models, players can only interact with their near-
est neighbors (8 in the case of a Moore neighborhood on
a planar square lattice). The most important finding was
that cooperativity arises and persists in such systems for
certain parameter regions.
In this paper, we have investigated the behavior of the
same low information PGG system with spatial restric-
tions removed using a network model. Here, players in-
teract with others without regard to any distance met-
ric. Single game sizes can become much larger and are
only bounded by the total number of players in this spa-
tially unconstrained model. We find that high cooper-
ation regimes exist for a wide range of parameters (see
Figure 6) as they did for the constrained system.
Intuitively, it makes sense that cooperative regions
would be more stable and persist in the cellular automa-
ton model once they develop, since such clusters are spa-
tially segregated from defectors, but it is surprising that
cooperation survives even in the spatially unconstrained
model given that cooperators are always exposed to ex-
ploitation by invading defectors.
Our simulations show that cooperative behavior is
the dominant strategy for certain parameter regions, re-
gardless of initial conditions. In particular we observe
the emergence of cooperation even when we start with
a highly disadvantageous initial strategy distribution,
where all players start out as defectors.
While the behavior of a network PGG shares quali-
tative similarities with the cellular automaton PGG, we
also observe marked differences: parameter regions for
cooperativity differ, relaxation times tend to be much
longer for the network model, and state variable fluctu-
ations (e.g., for instability, agglomeration, and cooper-
ation) are much more pronounced in the network PGG
where single game sizes are larger on average.
Observing the temporal development of system state
variables like payoff, satisfaction, instability, agglomera-
tion, and cooperation, we can distinguish several char-
acteristic periods; see Figure 2. In each of those peri-
ods, state variables can fluctuate greatly over short time
spans. In order to get a clearer picture of overall system
trends, we primarily study moving average time series as
in Figure 3.
Starting from a network without player connections,
consisting only of defectors, we find an initial period of
low cooperation and agglomeration undergoes a phase
transition into a late period of higher cooperation and
agglomeration for a wide regime of parameters. Both pe-
riods begin rapidly and are marked by a high degree of
instability. In the later period, while the moving average
number of cooperators is quite large, short-term fluctua-
tions occur where the number drops to nearly zero. This
indicates strong global synchronization of player strate-
gies made possible through the long-range interactions
on the network. Temporal variations of state variables
of this magnitude are nonexistent for the constrained 2D
lattice system.
The decision rule responsible for evolution in the model
is based on player satisfaction. Satisfied players do not
change strategies or connections while unsatisfied play-
ers may change with nonzero probability. However, an
unsatisfied player may break a connection to a satisfied
player so being satisfied does not guarantee stasis, even
short-term. The exponential decay of satisfaction due
to habituation triggers the extreme fluctuations in pay-
off and cooperator fraction as well as network rearrange-
ments as recorded by variables instability and agglom-
eration. When the same habituation model is used on
a 2D lattice, the effect of decaying satisfaction is signifi-
cantly more localized due to players being limited to eight
neighbors.
Despite dramatic temporal dynamics, characteriza-
tion of typical long-term states is possible. While a
steady state on an individual player level has not been
reached by the end of simulations after 20,000 time steps,
heatmaps of the cooperator fraction and average player
connections vary only slightly over the last several thou-
sand steps; see Figures 6 and 13.
We describe the PGG by a network model of interact-
ing players. This description makes it easy to describe
the characteristics of our particular network in a generic
way. In particular, we are able to study the evolution
of cooperation along with the growth of connections or
edges across the network.
We investigate the influence of different initial net-
work topologies on final state topology and cooperation.
Specifically, we compare starting from networks with no
connections to Bara´basi-Albert networks generated by
preferential attachment.1,4 Initial player connections do
not persist for very long and PGG cooperation dynamics
are fairly universal after a transient period of network re-
configuration. In all cases we find long time development
towards random regular networks.
9The total number of edges grows during the simula-
tions even though adding and removing edges at a certain
time occurs with equal probability. Evidently, adding
edges increases satisfaction more than removing edges.
Indeed, a connection to a defector may actually increase
a player’s net payoff if that defector is connected to suf-
ficiently many cooperators.
Edges are chosen for addition or removal at random
and we observe the accumulation of edges among play-
ers of both types tends toward the expectation for the
given number of cooperators and defectors; See Figures 9
and 10. This is further illustrated by the full network de-
gree distribution which becomes more narrow and peaked
as time increases; see Figure 7. Cooperation is robust to
the random rewiring in the model and does not require
the presence of high degree hubs to be maintained. No-
tably, the long-term network topology is quite homoge-
neous with no scale-free statistics, even when initialized
as a Bara´basi-Albert network. This result is especially
surprising in view of the fact that a fixed fully-connected
network, homogeneous in every way, does not support
cooperation, yet our cooperative PGG networks evolve
toward such a network.
We suggest that our network PGG model is remi-
niscent of and can be used to describe several real life
systems in which public goods are managed and ex-
changed like in open peer-to-peer networks, source code
development groups, wikipedia/collaborative online work
groups, crowd-source problem solving teams, insurance
and loan markets. It is important to notice that those
systems might still be very fluid and undergo frequent
and big changes on an individual level even if they oper-
ate in an overall cooperative regime.
Future research will explore the influence of more re-
alistic satisfaction measures, like the ones discussed in
Kahneman12 (prospect theory). It might be possible to
decouple single player behavior by allowing for limited
options of changes at a certain time step (new connec-
tion formation, or severance of existing connections, or
strategy changes at a single time step instead of allowing
all at the same time). Similarly, asynchronous (vs. syn-
chronous) updating might alleviate some synchronization
effects and should be investigated.
Appendix A: Time series oscillations
Cooperation, instability, and agglomeration time series
are shown in Figure 2 with a moving average over 100
time steps to illuminate long time trends. In Figure 12,
we plot the original data revealing the high frequency
oscillations discussed in Section IV and the relationship
between cooperation and instability. In Figure 12a, no-
tice that instability involves mainly strategy changes to-
ward cooperation yet in Figure 12b, over a longer time
frame, instability coincides with strategy changes as well
as increasing agglomeration.
Appendix B: Habituation rate derivation
In Section IV, we state that for short periods of time, a
player’s satisfaction decays exponentially at rate µ. Here
we show that explicitly by deriving Equation (7). As
before, assume pii(t) ≈ pii(t0) and pii,min(t) < pii(t) <
pii,max(t) for t0 ≤ t ≤ t1. Then, from Equation (4)
pii,max(t+1) = pii(t) + (1−µ) (pii,max(t)− pii(t))
pii,max(t+1)− pii(t0)
≈ (1−µ) [pii,max(t)− pii(t0)]
≈ (1−µ)2 [pii,max(t−1)− pii(t0)]
≈ (1−µ)3 [pii,max(t−2)− pii(t0)]...
≈ (1−µ)t+1−t0 [pii,max(t0)− pii(t0)] ,
where we’ve used pii(t) ≈ pii(t0). So, replacing t+ 1 by t,
we find
pii,max(t) ≈ (1−µ)t−t0 [pii,max(t0)− pii(t0)] + pii(t0).
Similarly, by Equation (5)
pii,min(t) ≈ (1−µ)t−t0 [pii,min(t0)− pii(t0)] + pii(t0).
We easily compute the aspiration and satisfaction from
Equations (3) and (2), respectively:
ai(t) ≈ pii(t0)− (1−µ)t−t0 [pii(t0)− pii,min(t0)]
+ α(1−µ)t−t0 [pii,max(t0)− pii,min(t0)]
= pii(t0)− (1−µ)t−t0
(
[pii(t0)− pii,min(t0)]
+ α[pii,max(t0)− pii,min(t0)]
)
,
si(t) ≈ (1−µ)t−t0
(
[pii(t0)− pii,min(t0)]
− α [pii,max(t0)− pii,min(t0)]
)
+ ηi(t).
Since (1 − µ)t−t0 = exp ((t− t0) log(1− µ)), satisfaction
decays exponentially at a rate |log(1− µ)| ≈ µ for 0 <
µ 1 as given by Equation (7) in Section IV.
Appendix C: Cooperation phase diagrams over time
The phase diagram in Figure 6 reveals the states of sys-
tems at t = 20000. Since simulations for various parame-
ters reach their characteristic long term states at different
times, it is interesting to observe the phase diagram de-
velop over time, as in Figure 13. Note in particular the
similarity between t = 10000 and t = 20000.
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FIG. 12. Time series data without windowed averaging. Note the differing time axis scales in 12a and 12b. Parameters are as
in Figure 2.
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FIG. 13. Phase diagram of cooperation at different simulation time steps. Parameters are as in Figure 6.
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